Abstract
This paper analyzes a unique set of state-level monthly survey data covering the eighteen months preceding the 2006 election to estimate (1) the effects of national and local conditions on the strength of challenges to incumbent senators and governors and (2) the effects of these challenges on changes in state electorates' ratings of officeholders and their share of votes on election day. The analysis confirms several of the basic components of the theory that the strategic behavior of candidates and campaign contributors amplify the effects of local and national conditions on election results, thereby enhancing electoral accountability. But it also uncovers a striking difference between the two offices: even taking the strongly pro-Democratic national climate into account, the election context had a strong tendency to reduce the approval ratings of Senators, while it had an equally strong tendency to increase the approval ratings of governors. We speculate as to what might account for this difference.
Regular elections are, among other things, supposed to enable ordinary citizens to hold elected leaders responsible, individually and collectively, for their performance in office. The prospect of reelection thereby gives leaders an incentive to work to satisfy citizens because unsatisfactory service can be and, on the occasion, will be punished by loss of office. It is now widely understood that, at least in the United States, strategically-minded politicians and activists play a pivotal part in making this process work. Partisans aspiring to replace the current incumbents are strongly motivated to monitor their performance and to report any malfeasance they detect to an otherwise rationally ignorant electorate. They are also acutely sensitive to the electoral opportunities that the individual or collective shortcomings of those in power may present. The better the prospects of replacing the incumbent member or party, the more likely talented and ambitious politicians are to take the field against them, and, because parties and campaign contributors also behave strategically, the more resources these superior candidates will have at their disposal if they do. Decisions about running for office or financing candidacies determine the options available to voters on election day-whether, for example, the alternative to a familiar incumbent is a qualified replacement with the resources to communicate effective arguments for change, or an obscure figure of unknown ability or purpose. Because voters are disinclined to support candidates in the latter category, the electorate's ability to act as "a rational god of vengeance and reward" when disenchanted with current leaders depends, at least in part, on an assist from strategic politicians and associated partisan activists. 1 Although the connections between electoral expectations, the quality of candidates, the vigor of their campaigns, and election results are well documented (Jacobson 2004) , our understanding of the processes forging these connections rests more on inference than on direct observation. We know that incumbents who seem vulnerable for any reason are likely to attract serious opposition and that serious opposition usually costs them votes and, less frequently, their jobs. But the causal dynamics are not fully understood: How and when is vulnerability assessed? How do local and national circumstances combine to shape electoral expectations? To what extent do strong challengers simply ride a favorable partisan tide, and 1 The phrase is V.O. Key's (1964, 567) ; the literature on strategic candidacies and their electoral effects includes Jacobson and Kernell (1983) ; Jacobson (1989 Jacobson ( , 2004 ; Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985) ; Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert (1997) ; Canon (1993) ; Fowler and McClure (1989) ; Kazee (1994) ; Krasno (1994) ; Lublin (1994) ; Maestas, et al. (2006) ; Maisel and Stone (1997) , Squire (1989 Squire ( , 1992 ; and Westlye (1991). to what extent do they help create the tide? How do their campaigns matter, and for which voters? How do these processes vary across offices? In this paper, we exploit a unique set of data covering an unusual election cycle-2005-2006 -to gain insights into these and other questions normally left in something of an analytical black box in literature on strategic politicians.
The Data and the Setting
Between May 2005 and November 2006, SurveyUSA, a polling firm whose main clients for its political surveys are local news media, conducted monthly statewide polls in all 50 states. Their automated telephone surveys asked samples of approximately 600 respondents in each state if they approved of the performance of G.W. Bush, the state's governor, and both of its senators, as well as questions about each respondent's party identification, ideology, religious-service attendance, and demographic characteristics (age, education, sex, race, and in some states, region). In some months they also asked respondents' positions on policy issues. The aggregate results, including breakdowns of the approval questions by all of the respondents' other characteristics, were posted on the internet shortly after the each survey was taken.
2 These data, if reliable, obviously have great potential value for addressing questions about the dynamics of state-level electoral politics during the 2005-2006 cycle. We thus examined the survey results carefully for internal and external consistency as well as intuitive plausibility, and they passed all of the tests very satisfactorily (Jacobson 2006 , Brown 2007 . The analyses we present here also provide something of a check on the plausibility of these data, and again the results, we believe, strongly reinforce our confidence in their accuracy and utility.
The SUSA data give us a measure of the public standing of every incumbent senator and governor who sought reelection in 2006 beginning more than 18 months before the election. They also document the trends in the approval ratings of each over the entire period leading up to election day. We can thus examine how an incumbent's standing with constituents well before the election season begins affects the kind of opposition they attract when they run for reelection, and we can track the effects, if any, of that opposition on their approval ratings and on their ultimate electoral fates. Because the approval data can be broken down by party identification, we can also test for variations in campaign effects across partisan subgroups. In short, these data offer a unique window into how one important factor shaping the expectations of potential challengers and their potential alliesthe incumbent's personal standing with constituents-affects strategic behavior, and how their strategic choices affect subsequent popular opinion and behavior.
Electoral expectations are shaped by both local and national conditions. The 2006 midterm election is especially useful for assessing strategic responses to national conditions because the potential for a strong pro-Democratic national tide was unmistakable early on. 
Senators: Basic Data
The basic data on the twenty-nine incumbent senators seeking reelection in 2006 appears in as an independent, is of course a special case).
3. Among Republicans, the lower the initial approval rating, the more the rating declined during the campaign-exactly opposite the "regression toward the mean" we would expect to observe if nothing systematic (for example, the formidable challenges they attracted) were affecting their ratings. The correlation between initial ratings and the magnitude of change is .79. Thus the stronger challenges incurred by Republicans with low initial job approval ratings seem to have pushed them even lower. Among Democrats, change in approval is unrelated to initial approval.
4. Differences between the parties suggest that national conditions interacted with local conditions to shape candidacies and outcomes; Democrats generally avoided formidable opposition regardless of local standing, reflecting the prevailing pro-Democratic national climate. Republicans did not.
A more detailed examination of the data reinforces these interpretations. Figure 1 displays the relationships between senators' job approval ratings in 2005 and their share of votes in the 2006 election. As noted, the former predict the latter for both parties with considerable accuracy, but the slopes and intercepts differ significantly by party (see Table   2 ). Most Democrats, and all Democrats with initial approval ratings below 65 percent, lost (the one loser, Ehrlich, was rated a little above 50 percent in both periods)
4. In contrast to Republican senators, there is no evidence that Republican governors with lower initial ratings systematically suffered a further decline over the election year;
rather we find evidence of a regression toward the mean (the correlation is -.57 between the two periods across this set of incumbents).
5. The national pro-Democratic tide running in 2006 did not leave gubernatorial elections untouched, but its impact was the same for incumbents of both parties. This is evident from results of the regressions in Table 4 and the data in Figure 2 . The interaction term between party and 2005 approval was not significant and destroyed the precision of 8 It should be noted that Granholm's challenger contributed $35 million to his own campaign. been for spending to rise with state population (increasing costs) but at a decreasing rate (scale economies), so that neither total nor per-voter spending (nor their logs) permit straightforward comparisons, forcing scholars to adopt various ploys for dealing with the problem (Jacobson 1980 (Jacobson , 1985 Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Gerber 1998) . In recent elections, however, the relationship between campaign spending and population has weakened, as massive sums have been spent in even the least populous states where the outcome has been in doubt. 9 This was again the case in 2006 (note the spending figures for the Montana Senate race and the Maryland gubernatorial contest). We found that the total spending figure or its log transformation, neither adjusted for population, produced the strongest statistical relationships. The log transformation provides the better fit in a majority of cases, so we use it here, although the same substantive conclusions would be supported if we used the untransformed financial data as our basic measure of a campaign's strength.
Early approval ratings strongly predict the financial resources mobilized against both
Republican and Democratic senators ( Senate incumbents' finances were also shaped by strategic considerations. As always, their funding reflected the magnitude of the challenge they faced (Jacobson 2004) and thus, at least indirectly, the same national and local conditions that influenced challengers' finances. There is a significant negative relationship between approval and incumbent spending (r = -.75 for Republicans, r = -.36 for Democrats), but it completely washes out once challenger spending is controlled. Republican incumbents' funding was especially sensitive to their opponents' funding; regressing the former on the latter produces an intercept of about $2 million and a slope of 1.05, with an excellent fit to the data (R 2 = .92). Democratic incumbents also spent reactively, but the relationship is not as precisely estimated, mainly because of Hillary Clinton, who was spending the money for obvious purposes unconnected with the electoral threat she faced in New York (see Table 1 ); the intercept for Democratic incumbents is $6.5 million with a slope of .71 and an R 2 of .28.
Without Clinton, the estimate of the slope is the same but the intercept falls to $4.9 million and the R 2 increases to .67. 11 The analysis subtracts candidates' own funds, as they are not subject to such stringent strategic calculations. Notice in to $5.7 million against the least popular incumbent (41 percent approving). Note: The dependent variable is the natural log of the total spending by and for the challenger; robust standard errors. Challenger-supplied funds are subtracted from the totals. † p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
Incumbent governors' fundraising was, like that of senators, also shaped by strategic considerations, and again Republican incumbents' funding was more sensitive to their own 12 The proportion in the state believing that the Iraq War had been a mistake had no effect on the finances of Republican challengers but was correlated negatively with the Democratic incumbent's approval rating, an artifact of highly popular Democratic governors in the very red states of Wyoming and Oklahoma. Table 3 ), the respective figures are $1.7 million, 1.39, and .56. The effects of approval are tiny and insignificant when spending by Republican challengers is taken into account.
The Effects of Strong Challenges on Changes in Approval Ratings
The next question is whether the well-funded challenges provoked by local and Table 7 displays the results of regressing change in approval on initial approval and spending by and for Senate incumbents and challengers. The first equation indicates that, other things equal, there was no partisan difference in change in approval ratings. Changes in approval ratings of both parties' incumbents were related to campaign spending in the expected direction, although in every case, the effects of incumbent spending cannot be reliably distinguished from zero. Among Democrats, the overall fit is poor and the results barely significant, but they indicate that, other things equal, the incumbent would gain about 1 percentage point in approval against the worst funded opponent while losing about 9 points against the best funded opponent. No Democrat is predicted to have a September-October approval rating that falls below 50 percent.
The fit is much better for Republicans, although collinearity between incumbent and challenger spending makes for a rather imprecise estimate of the effects of the latter; if incumbent spending is dropped, the coefficient on challenger spending shrinks slightly (to -1.38) but become significant at p<.002 and the R 2 is unaffected. The coefficient indicates that the change in approval would again range from about +1 points against the lowest spending challenger to about -9 points against the highest spending challenger. However, three of the Republicans are predicted to end up with approval ratings below 50 percent, with another two below 51 percent; all five of them eventually wound up losing. Lieberman's pattern was highly unusual. Elsewhere, the declines in senators' approval ratings during the election year tended to be much larger among opposition partisans and independents than among the senators' partisans. Table 8 displays the average changes in approval rating broken down by party identification and by whether or not the challenger mounted a well-financed campaign. Incumbents of both parties who faced only weak challenges lost little support overall or from any partisan subgroup (only Akaka, whose support dropped almost equally across partisan categories, deviates from this general pattern). For those who were strongly challenged, the decline in approval was concentrated among opposition partisans and, to a lesser extent, independents. On average, the ratings of strongly challenged Republican senators dropped by 14.7 points among Democrats, by 6.6 points among independents, but by only 3.4 points among Republicans. The ratings of strongly challenged Democrats (excluding the anomalous Lieberman) fell by 9.9 points among Republicans, by 6.8 points among independents, but they actually rose slightly (1.5 points) among Democratic partisans.
The evidence here, then, suggests that one important effect of a strong senate challenge was to reduce the incumbent's appeal to those constituents who did not share his or her party affiliation. This had the arithmetical effect of producing a more polarized electorate. For strongly challenged Republicans, the average difference in approval ratings offered by Republican and Democratic constituents grew from 30 points to 41 points; among strongly challenged Democrats, it grew from 25 points to 36 points (again, Lieberman aside).
Weak challenges, in contrast, did not increase partisan divisions on the approval question.
14 Gubernatorial approval ratings also changed in response to campaign money spent over the course of the election year, but the patterns differ in important ways from those observed for senators (Table 9) . First, other things equal, changes favored incumbent Democrats by 4.4 percentage points over incumbent Republicans; this was not true of senators, for whom the coefficient on party was tiny and insignificant. The regressions estimates reported in Table 9 also suggest that, unlike senators, sitting governors' own campaign spending significantly affected changes in their approval ratings, with the coefficient on spending if anything larger than that for challengers. The coefficients and constants that appear when parties are analyzed separately also indicate little difference between Republicans and Democrats in how money affected changes in approval. The coefficients on challenger spending indicate that, with the value for incumbent funds calculated from a regression of incumbent on challenger spending and lagged approval set at its mean, the approval ratings of the Democrat with the most poorly financed opponent would rise about 5.5 points, while the Democrat opposed by the most lavishly financed opponent would rise 2.2 points. The equivalent figures for Republicans were 1.3 points and 0.2 points, respectively. That is, with the expected counter-spending by incumbent governors taken into account, the approval ratings of all governors would be predicted to rise during the election year. This surprising result is confirmed by the data in Table 10 . Regardless of whether they faced low or high spending challengers, incumbent governors of both parties on average gained approval points during the campaign. Gains were greatest among their own partisans, somewhat smaller among independents, and lowest among opposition party identifiers, with the only decline recorded among opposition partisans of Democrats with high-spending opponents. Consistent with the first equation in Table 9 , Democrats on average enjoyed larger gains than Republicans. Why these results diverged so much from those for senators is a question we explore after examining how these variables affected the vote in 2006.
The Vote
The first equation in Table 11 treats the Senate incumbent's vote in 2006 as a function of campaign spending and party. Only challenger spending is included in equations for senators, because when logged incumbent spending is added, it displays the wrong sign and its collinearity with logged challenger spending (r = .85) makes estimates of the latter's effect wildly imprecise. When September-October approval is added, the coefficient on challenger spending drops sharply although it remains significant; spending evidently affected the vote directly as well as through its effect on approval ratings. As with the original effects of May-December 2005 approval (Table 2 and Figure 1) , the relationship varies by party, although the partisan difference in slopes is not as dramatic. As Figure 3 shows, every Democrat whose late approval rating fell below 65 percent received a share of votes greater than his or her rating (e.g., their vote shares lie above the diagonal); most 
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Republicans Democrats for the results (Table 12 ). Challenger spending is so highly correlated with these other two variables that its estimated effect on the vote is insignificant once they are controlled, although entered by itself it explains 79 percent of the vote's variance. In sum, then Republican Senate incumbents who showed early signs of personal vulnerability, and who also faced both national and local anti-administration sentiments, (Table 13 ). There was, however, a significant negative relationship between the Republican challenger's spending and the incumbent's vote independent of approval levels. Although local variables-the incumbent's approval level and the challenger's resources-explain much of the variance in the share of votes won by Senate Democrats, their effects were so overshadowed by the pro-Democratic national climate that none came close to losing (see Table 1 ). Potential Republican candidates and contributors who declined to invest heavily in challenges to Senate Democrats in 2006 made the strategically correct decision, but their demurral enhanced the advantage that popular unhappiness with the Bush administration had handed to Democratic senators seeking reelection. The vote for governor also showed an across-the board Democratic advantage of about the same magnitude as in Senate elections (Table 14) . Both the challenger and incumbent spending coefficients behave reasonably but become insignificant when we add September-October approval to the mix, suggesting that spending worked largely through its effect on approval. But notice that adding September-October approval improves the overall fit dramatically, indicating that components of approval unconnected with campaign spending dominated the process. Notice also that, unlike the case with senators, immediate pre-election approval has a considerably stronger relationship with the vote than does 2005
approval. There was no difference in the slopes on late pre-election approval for Republican and Democrats, but the gap remains (see Figure 4 ).
Comparing the patterns in Figure 4 with those in Figure 3 , it is apparent that low approval ratings late in the campaign were considerably less damaging to governors than to senators. All six approved by half or fewer of their state's citizens still won, five with more than 55 percent of the vote (the only loser, Ehrlich, had a pre-election approval rating of 51 
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Republicans Democrats percent.) On average, the vote share of the nine governors whose September-October approval ratings fell below 55 percent ran 8.6 percentage points above their approval ratings, (the seven Democrats, 11.6 points higher, the four Republicans, 4.8 points higher). The vote share of the ten senators in the same predicament ran an average of only 3.6 points above their late-season approval rating, and only because the three Democrats ran 9.3 points higher; the seven Republicans won vote shares only 1.3 points higher than their final approval. Thus although there were seven governors as well as ten senators whose performance was approved by fewer than 55 percent of their constituents, all but one governor won reelection while six of the senators were voted out of office. The strongest evidence of consequential strategic behavior is provided by challengers to incumbent Republican senators; the lower their 2005 approval ratings, the stronger the opposition they provoked, and the stronger the opposition, the more their approval ratings declined and the worse they did on election day. The effects of national and local conditions were clearly reinforced in these contests by the strategic decisions of Democratic challengers and contributors. Republican governors also tended to attract stronger opposition the lower their approval ratings, but the relationship is weaker, and stronger opposition did not systematically reduce their standing with the public or cost them votes. Unlike incumbent senators, incumbent governors were apparently able to offset the effects of a high-spending opponent by spending money themselves. We offer this conclusion cautiously because the financial data for gubernatorial candidates are incomplete, but the evidence is consistent for both parties regardless of whether the dependent variable is change in approval ratings or the November vote. And our confidence in it is reinforced by the striking differences in the What could account for this difference? It cannot simply be that senators, as national politicians, were more strongly affected by national political forces than were state-level politicians, for the differences hold for Democrats and Republicans alike. We suspect the answer lies in the nature of the two offices and the different degree of political exposure their holders face. As legislators, senators enjoy ample opportunity for advertising, positiontaking, and credit claiming (Mayhew 1974) as well as a variety of procedures for avoiding the traceable actions that might offend constituents (Arnold 1990) . Each is only one of a hundred, so none is fully and directly responsible for any policy decision. Senators are normally free to be responsive to constituents' interests and opinions while avoiding individual responsibility for results that constituents would not appreciate (Jacobson 2004 ).
Discussion
The campaign context, however, exposes them to greater scrutiny and criticism, at least insofar as challengers are able to identify unpopular actions for which incumbents bear some plausible blame and have the financial resources to let voters know about them. The customary positive bias in the information projected about individual senators (not a little of which comes from their own offices) diminishes and may shift sharply in the negative direction if damaging issues arise and are exploited by effective challengers. The campaign season also makes their status as partisans more salient. They thus tend to lose popularity during the campaign season.
Governors, in contrast, are executives who cannot avoid responsibility for the unpopular actions of the state governments they head even when they have little real control over them. They cannot escape blame for the consequences of hard choices-raising taxes, cutting services, or initiating other policies that create clear winners and losers-that inevitably displease some segments of their constituencies. Their ratings may also suffer from whatever broader discontents arise within a state (e.g., approval of governors is strongly and negative related to state-level unemployment rates 15 ). Governors are a principal focus of state political news coverage, which is more inclined to dwell on shortcomings than to celebrate successes. It is simply harder for governors than for senators to do their jobs without alienating some of the people who elected them. Negative information about their performance is already in wide circulation before the campaigns begins. Their campaigns may thus provide an opportunity to remind voters of the good news and to rebuild eroded support among components of their original electoral coalitions.
These are admittedly speculations, but it is indicative that the largest drop in senators' approval levels during the 2006 campaigns occurred among opposition party identifiers, especially where there was a high spending challenger, whereas the largest increase in approval of governors occurred among their own partisans (Table 15) . That is, senators lost esteem among those who would be most sensitive to new or newly salient negative information about them-opposing partisans and, to a lesser degree, independents, whereas
Governors gained esteem among those who would be most responsive to new or newly salient positive information about them-their own partisans and independents. This would help to explain why Senate incumbents do worse the more money spent by their opponents and are unable to offset the damage by their own expenditures, while incumbent governors seem to benefit at least as much as their challengers from campaign expenditures. Obviously, a good deal of additional research is needed to determine if these results are more than an idiosyncratic feature of 2006 and reflect true systematic differences in the electoral circumstances faced by executives and legislators. But if our speculation is on target, then the strategic information contained in approval ratings of incumbents in the year preceding an election has to be read differently for senators and governors. A senator who is viewed positively but only by a modest margin-for example, with approval ratings between 50 and 60 percent-may be objectively more vulnerable than a governor with much lower approval ratings; and a governor with ratings in the 40s is not necessarily a sitting duck for that reason alone.
